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I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an influential group of scholars has argued that economic
efficiency and wealth maximization provide the proper guides for how judges
should decide cases.' The increasing influence of this law and economics
approach has prompted a debate regarding its appropriateness and
desirability. President Reagan's recent appointment of several law and
economics scholars to the federal judiciary has raised a new aspect of this
debate: How effectively can law and economics scholars apply their beliefs as
law and economics judges?
In 1983, Professor Frank H. Easterbrook2 wrote an article in the Harvard
Law Review 3 critiquing the Supreme Court's use (or nonuse) of law and
economics reasoning. Professor Easterbrook explicitly set forth three
fundamental criteria for assessing a court's performance on economic issues:
(1) a focus on ex ante (incentive creating), as opposed to ex post (fairness),
considerations; (2) an understanding that how people respond to regulation
depends on marginal, rather than average effects; and (3) an appreciation of
the private-interest-group nature of legislation. 4
In 1984, President Reagan appointed Professor Easterbrook to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.5 In his new role, Judge Easterbrook has
authored fewer than 200 opinions;6 nevertheless, he has already
demonstrated a willingness and ability to follow the law and economics
guidelines endorsed in his Harvard Law Review article. In fact, an examination
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1. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 17 (2d ed. 1977).
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3. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98
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5. Professor Easterbrook was appointed on April 10, 1985. THE AMERICAN BENCH (4th ed.
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of Judge Easterbrook's judicial decisions reveals that he consistently uses his
law and economics analysis as support. 7
II
SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
This note seeks to determine the extent to which Frank Easterbrook, as a
federal court of appeals judge, has employed the law and economics
philosophy he subscribed to while a law and economics professor. To achieve
this end, it is not necessary to determine whether his economic beliefs are
logical, consistent, or even desirable. A vigorous debate has already occurred
on that issue and is best left to economists. Furthermore, other scholars
committed to different economic perspectives will surely be appointed to the
federal bench. Their ability to employ their economic beliefs will be equally
germane. Finally, this note makes no attempt to compare and contrast Judge
Easterbrook's conservative economic approach with that of other conservative
economists, or to suggest that Judge Easterbrook's views are completely
representative of the conservative school. Every law and economics scholar
has distinct beliefs. The question asked here is whether a particular
economist can effectively employ his beliefs as a law and economics judge.
III
APPLICATION OF PROFESSOR EASTERBROOK'S ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
As mentioned above, Professor Easterbrook's economic philosophy
focuses on an understanding of incentives, marginal effects, and the private-
interest-group nature of legislation. In order to facilitate a reading of the
detailed sections to follow, a hypothetical case is presented to demonstrate
how his economic analysis might be applied. Suppose that Congress passes a
statute in 1987, with the purpose of increasing safety, that requires auto
manufacturers to install airbags in every new car. The statute explicitly
requires manufacturers to use the best airbag system technologically feasible
as of 1987. The statute provides a detailed description of the required airbag
system, but does not mention the use of subsequently discovered technology.
A. Incentive Creation
Ex ante (incentive creating) considerations might arise in the intellectual
property context. If in 1990, an inventor patents an improved airbag system
which increases safety without increasing price, the inventor will sell rights to
use the system to those manufacturers who can afford the market price (for
instance, General Motors and Ford), but not to manufacturers who cannot
afford or are not willing to pay the market price (for instance, Chrysler). It
will seem inefficient to some that Chrysler cars do not incorporate the
7. The cases used in this paper were chosen as the best examples ofJudge Easterbrook's use of
his economic beliefs to support his judicial decisions. He also applied his economics beliefs in his
other opinions whenever possible.
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improved technology, especially if the inventor already appears to be getting a
"fair" price for his efforts. Under Professor Easterbrook's ex ante analysis,
however, a judge would recognize the necessity to compensate today's
inventors not only for their product, but to provide incentives (potential
profits) for inventors to create new technology tomorrow."
B. Marginal Effects
Now suppose that the new technology significantly increases the cost of
cars. Professor Easterbrook would reject, on economic grounds, a petition
from a consumer group to require manufacturers to use the improved (and
more expensive) 1990 technology, instead of the cheaper 1987 technology
explicitly required by the statute. He would recognize that the potential
responses to such a judicial regulation would depend upon marginal effects.
If auto manufacturers are required to spend more money on airbags, they may
respond by reducing the quality of other parts of cars-perhaps the brakes-
or by raising the price of cars. If the price of new cars is higher, then some
consumers will respond by buying fewer new cars and keeping their old cars
longer. In effect, they will substitute repair service for new cars. Because
most older cars would have no airbags, a regulation requiring a more
expensive airbag system might reduce actual overall safety.
C. Statutory Interpretations
Recognizing the interest group nature of the legislation, Professor
Easterbrook would also refuse to interpret the statute as requiring the new
1990 technology. He would view the statute as a contract, brokered by
Congress, between auto manufacturers and safety interest groups. As such,
he would strictly enforce the explicit requirements of the statute-utilization
of 1987 airbag technology-and reject petitions to enforce anything else. He
would specifically reject the argument that because the statute was designed
to increase safety; the statute must therefore implicitly require use of the new
technology. Instead, Professor Easterbrook would interpret the statute as if
the safety lobby won the fight over use of the 1987 airbag technology and the
auto lobby won the fight regarding use of subsequently created technology.
IV
Ex ANTE AND Ex POST PERSPECTIVES
In his Harvard Law Review article, Professor Easterbrook argued that
judges should take account of the ex ante (incentive creating) effects of
judicial decisionmaking because the legal rules formulated today will
influence the actions of other parties in similar situations tomorrow. He
8. Professor Easterbrook realizes that a system which yields optimal creation (strict royalty
system) prevents optimal use, and vice versa. He does not assert that judges should always choose
optimal incentive creation, but only that judges should recognize the trade-off between optimal use
and creation. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 21-23 and accompanying notes.
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asserted that judges who take an ex post approach in analyzing economic
issues-treating the parties' circumstances as fixed and merely apportioning
gains and losses on the basis of "fairness," instead of appreciating that the
rules created by today's decisions produce incentives or disincentives for
future conduct-invariably ensure that there will be fewer gains and more
losses tomorrow. 9 In order to send the correct signals to the economic
system, ajudge must appreciate the consequences of legal decisions on future
behavior.1°
Professor Easterbrook specifically stressed the need for an ex ante
perspective with respect to decisions involving intellectual property
questions.
Problems involving intellectual property present the dichotomy between ex post and
ex ante perspectives especially starkly. Once someone has created information, the
cost of using the information is small. . . . Because the marginal cost of using
information is small or even zero, there is a strong [ex post] case for establishing a
system of legal rules that makes the information freely available.... Yet from an ex
ante perspective it is necessary to compensate the inventor... [because] the lower the
rewards [for inventors today,] the fewer [inventions] there will be [in the future.]"I
Professor Easterbrook's ex ante views freely appear in Judge Easterbrook's
intellectual property decisions. In Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Service Co. of
Railroads, 12 a copyright holder had organized information contained in public
records to make a map template. The alleged infringer created an updated
map by adding current information to the protected template. The alleged
infringer failed to re-create from scratch the copyright holder's work on the
original template. Although this work would have taken only forty-five hours,
Judge Easterbrook upheld a finding of infringement and ordered the infringer
to pay $22,000 in legal fees in addition to the $250 statutory penalty (the
extent of actual damages).' 3 Neither the absence of a marginal cost of using
the original template information nor the paucity of actual damage factored in
Judge Easterbrook's decision; instead he focused on the ex ante incentive
considerations.
Judge Easterbrook employed similar ex ante reasoning in Tolliver v.
Northrop Corp. 14 when rejecting a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure section
60(b) motion. In Tolliver, the plaintiff's Title VII claim was dismissed because
her attorney failed to answer interrogatories in a timely fashion. Under an ex
post analysis, a judge may have restored the plaintiff's action on fairness
grounds-reasoning that a client should not be punished for the
incompetence of her lawyer as long as the defendant had not been prejudiced.
Judge Easterbrook, however, rejected this approach and instead strictly
followed an ex ante approach. His reasoning focused on creating the proper
incentives for future litigants.
9. Id. at 10-11.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id. at 21.
12. 768 F.2d 145 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. Id.
14. 786 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Holding the client responsible for the lawyer's deeds ensures that both clients and
lawyers take care to comply. If the lawyer's neglect protected the client from ill
consequences, neglect would become . . . a free good. . . . The court's power to
dismiss a case is designed both to elicit action from the parties in the case at hand and
to induce litigants and lawyers in other cases to adhere to timetables.15
A static ex post view would have ignored the costs associated with creating
disincentives for complying with future orders to answer interrogatories. 16
Judge Easterbrook also applied a strict ex ante perspective in Stevenson v.
Board of Elections.17 This case involved a statute which required independent
candidates seeking state office to file prior to the party primaries.
Gubernatorial candidate Adlai Stevenson, who refused to run on the
Democratic Party ticket after winning the primary because adherents of
Lyndon LaRouche were also on the Democratic ticket, attempted to run as an
independent candidate. Stevenson claimed that the statute requiring him to
file prior to the primary unconstitutionally hindered his access to the ballot.
The court upheld that statute on the grounds that a state can regulate
intraparty factionalism and squabbling in order to ensure an orderly and
informed election process.' 8 In his concurrence, Judge Easterbrook more
explicitly stated the ex ante rationale for upholding the statute: The state may
hinder access to the ballot for today's candidates in order to encourage
tomorrow's candidates to settle intraparty disputes, abide by party primary
results, and avoid the carrying of intraparty disputes through disputes before
the general election.' 9
Judge Easterbrook further demonstrated his commitment to ex ante
analysis in two opinions enforcing private contracts. One concerned a
contract requiring the parties to arbitrate disputes; the other case involved a
contract containing an agreement not to compete.
In E. L Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Independent Association,20
an employee was discharged after a mental breakdown caused him to violently
attack fellow workers and to damage company property. The labor contract
provided that an employee could be discharged only for "just cause" as
determined by an arbitrator. 2' The arbitrator reasoned that lack of fault must
be considered in determining just cause, and concluded that since the
employee's outburst resulted from an involuntary mental breakdown, just
cause was not established. 22
The majority accepted the argument that the arbitrator's decision should
be overturned if it violated the public policy of ensuring a safe working
15. Id. at 319.
16. It should be noted that Judge Easterbrook rejected the intermediate solution of restoring
the plaintiff's claim on equity grounds while protecting the efficiency interest by using court-imposed
sanctions on negligent attorneys.
17. 794 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook,J., concurring).
18. Id. at 1177.
19. Id. at 1179.
20. 790 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 613.
22. Id.
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environment. 23 However, the majority ultimately held that since the chance
of a recurrence of the employee's outburst was remote, the reinstatement did
not undermine that public policy. 24
In his concurrence, Judge Easterbrook proved much more eager than the
majority to uphold the arbitrator's decision. He asserted that an arbitration
award cannot be overturned on public policy grounds unless the award
violates some positive rule of law, not just an ambiguous public policy.2 5
"Public policy in this loose sense is off limits to courts . ... "26 Judge
Easterbrook's eagerness to strictly enforce arbitration agreements stems from
his adherence to the ex ante principle. As stated in his Harvard Law Review
article: "When a court declines to enforce the arbitration agreement, it makes
others .. .worse off. These people no longer can strike one kind or bargain
[in the future] because they can [no longer confidently] agree to
arbitrate .. ."27
Judge Easterbrook employed similar reasoning in Polk Brothers v. Forrest
City Enterprises. 28 In Polk, two firms agreed to jointly build their two stores on a
single tract of land. The attraction of the arrangement was the
complementary nature of the two firms' products: one sold appliances and
home furnishings; the other sold building materials, lumber, tools, and
related products. Together, the two stores could offer a full line of products
for the furnishing and maintenance of a home. To alleviate their concerns
that cooperation would be replaced by competition, the two firms negotiated
a contract that included a covenant restricting each from selling the other's
products. This arrangement eventually broke down and led to an attempt to
void the covenant. 29
Judge Easterbrook overturned a district court's holding that the covenant
violated antitrust law. He found that the cooperation resulting from the
covenant had promoted a productive enterprise because it played an
important role in inducing the two retailers to build the stores. Without the
covenant not to compete, the retailers would not have entered into the
arrangement because of concerns of freeriding.30
As a remedy, Judge Easterbrook granted a permanent injunction
enforcing the covenant. 3' He followed the ex ante view, writing: "A legal rule
that enforces covenants not to compete . . .makes it easier for people to
23. Id. at 615.
24. Id. at 616-17.
25. See id. at 617-20.
26. Id. at 620.
27. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 11.
28. 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
29. Id. at 187-88.
30. Id. at 190. For example, if one store attracted customers by spending substantial sums
advertising and demonstrating the products, the store next door could lure away those customers by
quoting a lower price. The second store could afford this by keeping the products in boxes and
letting the first store bear the costs of advertising and sales personnel.
31. Id. at 195.
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cooperate productively in the first place." 32 By upholding the covenant,
Judge Easterbrook preserved the ability of other firms similarly situated to
make similar contracts in the future.
V
EFFECTS ON THE MARGIN
Professor Easterbrook warned that a judge's efforts to influence future
conduct are doomed unless he understands how people respond to
incentives. Because people respond to marginal rather than average effects,
they substitute among opportunities until they receive approximately the
same reward from the final increment of investment in each of their activities.
They buy or do a little more of one thing and a little less of another until
further changes are not worthwhile. At that point the marginal gains of each
activity are approximately equal. Change the return on the margin and
people alter their behavior; change the returns somewhere inside the margin
and people are unlikely to alter their behavior in the desired way-if at all.33
One implication of substitution on the margin is that firms will alter their
conduct to avoid the effects of regulation. For instance, if a court restricts the
price a firm may charge, the firm will respond by changing the quality of its
product, deferring delivery, or making various other adjustments. Therefore,
according to Professor Easterbrook, in order to ensure that a regulation has
its intended effect, a judge must not only enforce the initial regulation, but he
must also create and enforce additional regulations which deal with, or
prevent, the subsequent responses to the initial regulation.3 4
In his Harvard Law Review article, Professor Easterbrook analyzed Allen v.
Wright 3 5 to demonstrate this point. Allen involved a claim that the IRS had not
acted with sufficient vigor in investigating and terminating the tax exemptions
of private schools that engaged in racial discrimination. Professor
Easterbrook asserted that in such a case, a court should not attempt to
regulate the IRS by ordering it to enforce more stringently the rules denying
tax exemptions to those engaged in discrimination, because the decision of
the IRS to enforce a certain rule more or less stringently depends on the
marginal utility of all of the tasks assigned to the IRS. 3 6 The IRS might have
been slack in enforcing antidiscrimination laws because it believed its limited
resources were better spent collecting delinquent taxes.3 7 Furthermore, any
order requiring the IRS to more vigorously enforce the law would necessarily
32. Id. at 189.
33. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 33; see also id. at 12-14.
34. Id. at 38-40.
35. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
36. Id.
37. Professor Easterbrook's theory does not require a judge to decide whether money is better
spent on collecting taxes than on enforcing antidiscrimination laws, but only to recognize that such a
trade-off exists. He appears to assume that the IRS officials did recognize that trade, and is willing to
defer to their judgment.
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require a judge to compare the agency's actual performance against an
abstract standard of diligence. Yet, as Professor Easterbrook explained:
[C]omparing the facts of one case against a standard of decision directs attention in
the wrong place [average effects]. This is not the margin on which an administrator
works. The IRS ... compares case against case. The prosecutor's resources are
limited; Congress fixes the budget at the same time it lays down the tasks. The budget
is no less important than the list of tasks, and the idea of "faithful execution" is that
the executive will make the tradeoffs necessary to do the most with the resources at
hand. It may accomplish more of its assigned mission by reallocating resources until
they are equally productive at the margin. The judge, comparing [performance]
against standard, cannot see the tradeoff because he cannot see the rest of the
agency's menu and has no incentive to respond to [the restraints imposed by] the
agency's budget.
3 8
Thus, a judge who understands effects on the margin will not undertake such
regulation of the IRS without being prepared to deal with or accept
responsibility for the inevitable responses to the regulation.
Judge Easterbrook has employed this reasoning in several cases where he
has rejected pleas for court-imposed regulation. In Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton
Water Tower,39 Judge Easterbrook rejected a worker's claim that his union
violated his right to fair representation by supplying him with an inferior
advocate to pursue his grievance. Judge Easterbrook refused to regulate the
union's grievance apparatus by setting a minimum standard. He stated:
[Courts should not] interfere with employees' right to choose the level of care for
which they are willing to pay .... A Union may choose to rely on part-time, untrained,
overworked grievers-with the inevitable difference in the outcome of some cases-
rather than purchase a higher quality of representation. A Union may conclude that
its limited resources should [instead] go into a strike fund or toward negotiating the
next contract.
40
This holding, and the rationale supporting it, demonstrates Judge
Easterbrook's adherence to his analysis of Allen v. Wright.
Judge Easterbrook employed similar reasoning in rejecting a Section 1983
claim in Walker v. Rowe. 4 1 In Walker, injured prison guards claimed that the
prison warden had violated their civil rights by failing to take every
conceivable safety measure (shakedowns and a constant lockdown) to prevent
a riot. The judge recognized that the government sacrifices safety for other
values-like personal liberty for prisoners-and that given its limited
resources the government may choose between alternatives-such as building
newer prisons, hiring more guards, or providing greater compensation to
injured guards-to deal with the risks inherent in prisons. Judge Easterbrook
also speculated that the guards similarly substituted on the margin between
safety and other benefits: "Would-be guards, represented by their labor
unions, may decide to accept a little less safety in exchange for a little higher
pay." 42
38. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 41-42.
39. 786 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 244-45.
41. 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986).
42. Id. at 510.
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In Watkins v. Blinzinger,43 Judge Easterbrook again refused to regulate a
governmental agency. There, an Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) recipient challenged the decision of Indiana state officials to
characterize a lump-sum personal injury compensation award as "income"
instead of as a "resource." The income classification prevents a recipient
from receiving aid for a fixed time. Had the award been considered a
resource, the recipient could have regained her AFDC benefits after spending
the money.44
Judge Easterbrook refused to order the state officials to treat the
compensation award as a resource because of the expected undesirable
responses to such a judicial regulation. He was particularly concerned that,
given its fixed AFDC budget, the state "might respond by reducing the
payments to all recipients of AFDC." 45 He further stated: "A court should
require such a revamping of the [AFDC] program only if the legislation at
hand leaves no alternative." 46 Implicit in his holding was an assumption that
the state officials had already balanced the marginal utility of their
classification choice with the marginal utility of the other choices made in
administering the AFDC program.
Judge Easterbrook also focused on the role of marginal effects in two
opinions involving election regulations. 47 Election regulations are governed
by the least restrictive alternative rule, which requires a state to utilize the
least restrictive regulation possible in order to achieve certain legitimate
objectives. In explaining this rule, the judge wrote:
[The] least restrictive alternative could be a formula for consistent invalidation,
because a judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with
something a little less drastic or a little less restrictive .... The point of looking at
alternate methods of regulation is that the state must justify each incremental restriction
in light of its incremental benefits .... If 95% of the benefit of a rule is achieved by the
first 5% of the restriction, this implies that the remaining 95% of the restriction-the
real bite of the rule-achieves almost nothing. It is a familiar problem in
regulation.... [Therefore], a comparison of marginal gains against marginal losses is
necessary.
4 8
While Judge Easterbrook does not necessarily break new ground in the
passage above, he demonstrates his commitment to focusing attention on
effects on the margin when evaluating judicial regulation. 49
Finally, in the bankruptcy context, Judge Easterbrook based a decision on
a variant of a basic tenet of the marginal utility analysis theory that
unprofitable firms should continue to operate as long as marginal revenues
43. 787 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1986).
44. Id. at 475.
45. Id. at 478.
46. Id.
47. Stevenson v. Board of Elections, 794 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring); Citizens forJohn W. Moore Party v. Board of Election Comm'r, 794 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir.
1986).
48. Citizens for John W. Moore Party, 794 F.2d at 1258-59 (citations and quotations omitted)
(emphasis added).
49. The same basic argument also appears in 794 F.2d at 1177-82.
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exceed marginal costs. 50 Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pacific Corp.5 1
involved a bankrupt railroad. The plaintiff had asked the court to offset a
$180,000 post-bankruptcy debt it owed the railroad with a $180,000 pre-
bankruptcy claim it had against the railroad. The plaintiff otherwise would
receive ten cents on the dollar ($18,000) for its pre-bankruptcy claim while
paying $180,000 for its post-bankruptcy debt. The district court labeled such
an outcome "fundamentally unfair." 52
On appeal, Judge Easterbrook reversed the court's decision and refused to
offset the pre-bankruptcy claim with the post-bankruptcy debt. He asserted
that the bankruptcy effectively created two firms-a pre-bankruptcy and a
post-bankruptcy firm-and the post-bankruptcy firm should be allowed to
succeed or fail on its own merits. 53
The judge explained his reasoning with an example:
Suppose a post-bankruptcy firm has monthly accounts receivable of $100,000 and
monthly accounts payable of $95,000 .... This firm should survive, notwithstanding
its prior bankruptcy. Bygones are bygones, and the future of this firm is profitable.
Suppose, however, $10,000 of the receivables are owed by someone who was a
creditor of a pre-bankruptcy firm. If the creditor can offset the new obligations against
the old debt, the post-bankruptcy firm will fail. It cannot go on collecting $90,000 and
paying $95,000 monthly. The setoff produces the failure of a firm that should
succeed. 5
4
In effect, Judge Easterbrook treated the pre-bankruptcy debts as sunk costs,
treated the post-bankruptcy balances as marginal costs, and found that
marginal revenues exceeded marginal costs. He focused his attention on
costs on the margin instead of simply observing, as the district court had, that
a $180,000 pre-bankruptcy debt is equivalent to a $180,000 post-bankruptcy
asset.
VI
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Professor Easterbrook identified and contrasted two schools of statutory
construction. The first school believes that laws are designed to serve public
interests by identifying certain evils to be redressed and by leaving to judges
the task of combatting those evils through any means available. The statute's
reach expands continuously so long as objectionable results persist.
Omissions and vague terms in the statute are interpreted as evidence of lack
of time or foresight on the part of the legislature. The judge should rectify
the legislature's shortcomings by filling in the gaps of the statute until the
50. For a discussion of this theory, see Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 12-13.
51. 785 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1986).
52. See id. at 564.
53. Id. at 565.
54. Id. at 565-66.
[Vol. 50: No. 4
EASTERBROOK: THE PROFESSOR'S APPROACH
identified evil is completely redressed. The maxim "Remedial statutes are to
be liberally construed" sums up this (incorrect) approach. 55
Professor Easterbrook rejected the notion that statutes represent an
attempt by the legislature to redress certain evils. Instead, he views laws as
compromises or deals between private interest groups. He believes that
interest groups, through their lobbying efforts, negotiate laws in a fashion
similar to two firms negotiating the terms of a contract. Therefore, he
believes that laws should be treated just like private contracts. To interpret or
enforce the statute, a judge must first identify the contracting parties and then
determine what they resolved and what they left unresolved. Judges should
strictly enforce the bargain struck by the parties-giving each party to the
contract exactly what it bargained for but no more and no less-and refuse to
extend the supposed public interest aims of the statute to benefit groups
which were not parties to the contract. 56
Judge Easterbrook demonstrated his adherence to this private contract
theory of statutes in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of
Way Employees. 57  Burlington presented the question of whether railroad
employees could be enjoined from secondary picketing. The Rail Labor Act
(RLA)58 does not prohibit secondary picketing. However, after enactment of
the RLA, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA)
and the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947, which do prohibit most secondary
boycotts.5 9 The NLRA does not, however, apply to railroads and its
employees .60
The Railroad contended that because secondary picketing has been
subject to injunction in every business since 1947, and because the railroad
industry was the subject of the earliest comprehensive labor relations
legislation, Congress must have enunciated through both the RLA and the
NLRA a public interest goal of enjoining secondary picketing in the railroad
industry. 6 1
Judge Easterbrook rejected this claim by treating both statutes as private
interest contracts rather than public interest laws. Thus, he refused to extend
the NLRA to cover railroads. "That secondary picketing is unlawful and
enjoinable today in almost every other industry is none of [this court's]
business. The Railroads are governed by the compromise Congress made in
[the RLA]." 6 2 Because the railroads were not parties to the bargain struck in
the NLRA, they were not entitled to any of its benefits.
Even though an objective of the RLA was to prevent industrial strife,
Judge Easterbrook was willing to pursue that objective only as far as provided
55. See Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 14.
56. See id. at 15-18, 45-46.
57. 793 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1982).
58. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1982).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
60. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (3) (1982).
61. 793 F.2d at 801.
62. Id. at 802.
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for in the RLA "contract." He recognized that the RLA had placed limits on
the pursuit of its objectives, and he strictly enforced those limits. Professor
Easterbrook's law and economics approach mandated such a result. In his
Harvard Law Review article, he stated:
If legislation grows out of compromises among special interests.., a court cannot add
enforcement to get more of what Congress wanted. What Congress wanted was the
compromise, not the objective of the contending interests.... [A statute's] stopping
points are as important as the other provisions. If the statute gave group X twenty-five
percent of what it wanted, it probably meant contending groups to keep the rest. A
court cannot observe that the statute gave group X more than it had before and then
keep moving in the same direction . . . without undoing the structure of the deal. 6
3
Judge Easterbrook recognized that the RLA provided the rule that
employees may resort to secondary pressures, and he viewed that rule as the
point where judges must stop pursuing the broader objectives of the Act. In
his opinion, the judge wrote:
Some statutes prescribe goals such as safety or competition and require courts to
devise the rules that will achieve those goals; others prescribe rules that will lead to
more or less of the goal. When Congress writes the rule, courts may not transmute
the statute into the other form by inventing new rules to pursue the goal Congress had
in mind. 64
By refusing to invent new rules, Judge Easterbrook preserved the bargain
struck in the RLA. 65
VII
CONCLUSION
Even though Judge Easterbrook has written fewer than 200 opinions, he
has already demonstrated an ability to utilize his law and economics beliefs to
provide support for his judicial decisions. The rationales supporting his
decisions closely mirror the arguments he made in the Harvard Law Review
article he wrote prior to becoming a judge. Passages that appear in his
decisions could just as easily have appeared in his article.
The extent to which Judge Easterbrook's adherence to his law and
economics approach affects the outcomes of cases remains an open question.
Economic analysis is an inexact science which can yield different results, even
from economists with similar beliefs and ideologies. 66 Furthermore, it is
impossible to determine whether Judge Easterbrook lets his economic
analysis of a case dictate his decision, or whether he initially decides the case
on some other ground and then uses economic reasoning to provide a
rationale for his decision.
63. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 46-47.
64. 793 F.2d at 802-03.
65. Judge Easterbrook employs the same reasoning in two other cases: Mercado v. Calumet
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 269, 271-72 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Medico Indus., 784
F.2d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 1986).
66. For example, see Professor Easterbrook's discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 36-37 n.79.
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WhateverJudge Easterbrook's decisionmaking process is, his appointment
to the bench, as well as the appointment of other law and economics scholars,
should have one predictable effect; it should focus the attention of litigants on
the economic aspects of their cases and the attention of judges on the
economic consequences of their decisions. When litigants come before law
and economics judges, they will probably rely more on economic analysis to
support their arguments; and when judges must interpret and apply
precedents written by law and economics judges, they too will likely increase
their consideration of the economic issues presented.

